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American elections are in the midst of fundamental change. This can be seen in 
multiple places, from voting rights and movements to ease or restrict ballot access to 
“voting wars” in election administration.1 On the one hand, change is always afoot in 
elections. Think of the transformations wrought by the Australian ballot in the late nine-
teenth century (where an ascendant norm of vote secrecy was said to have weakened par-
ty power)2 or the reapportionment mandated by Baker v. Carr in 1962.3 On the other 
hand, in the realm of campaign finance something new and big is clearly underway. The 
manner in which American elections are financed has changed in dramatic ways in just 
five years. 
Consider some basic evidence. In the 2000 Democratic and Republican presiden-
tial primaries, interest groups were responsible for four percent of the ads aired on behalf 
of John McCain, George Bush, Al Gore and Bill Bradley.4 In 2008, again with contested 
                                                
*  Associate Professor of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME. 
 1. RICK HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 4 (2012). 
 2. Alan Ware, Anti-Partism and Party Control of Political Reform in the United States: The Case of the 
Australian Ballot, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 8 (2000). 
 3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 4. Michael Franz, Interest Groups in Electoral Politics: 2012 in Context, 10(4) F: J. APPLIED RES. 
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nomination battles on both sides of the aisle—and an open White House for the first time 
since 1952—outside groups aired just three percent of the ads. In 2012, however, two 
years removed from Citizens United v. FEC5 and with super Political Action Committees 
(PACs) abundant, interest groups accounted for sixty percent of the over 122,000 ads 
aired during the Republican primary phase.6 As of this writing in fall 2015, the trend 
continues apace, with super PACs responsible for ninety percent of the early ad buys in 
the 2016 GOP presidential primary campaign.7 
Interest groups were present also in unparalleled ways in the general election phase 
of recent campaigns. Pro-Romney groups in 2012 aired over half of all ads that advocat-
ed for the GOP candidate. This shattered the previous record, when pro-Kerry groups 
bolstered his publicly funded general election with one in every four ads (at the time a 
stunning development in campaign finance) in the fall of 2004.8 In congressional elec-
tions in 2014, interest groups aired over thirty percent of all Senate ads in the entirety of 
the election year, up from the five percent investment typical of Senate elections between 
2000 and 2006. And in six highly competitive races that year, groups aired over forty-
five percent of the ads.9 
It is hard to overstate these changes, as they have had effects beyond the mere air-
waves. Every major candidate for president now announces their campaign in the wake 
of forming or helping to form super PACs and 501(c)(4) groups that subsequently take 
on major aspects of the campaign. The two major parties have formed parallel super 
PAC organizations (House Majority PAC and Majority PAC for the Democrats; Cross-
roads GPS and others such as American Action Network and Freedom Partners for the 
GOP) that raise and spend millions to advocate for their congressional candidates. More-
over, many of these congressional candidates have their own super PACs or non-profits 
staffed and run by former associates (and funded with million dollar checks).10 
These changes (among others) have compelled political scientists to conceptualize 
political parties as more than the traditional party organizations—long the focus of the 
scholarship—but now also as networks of affiliated advocacy groups.11 What a party is 
and means is now very different from what scholars like E.E. Schattschneider wrote 
                                                
CONTEMP. POL. 62, 66 (2013). 
 5. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 6. See Franz, supra note 4, at 66. 
 7. Michael Beckel, Super PACs Dominate Airwaves in 2016 Presidential Race, PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Sept. 
29, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/09/16/17995/super-pacs-dominate-airwaves-2016-
presidential-race. 
 8. See Franz, supra note 4, at 66. 
 9. Michael Franz, Interest Group Issue Appeals: Evidence of Issue Convergence in Senate and Presiden-
tial Elections, 2008-2014, 12(4) F: J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 685, 688 (2015). 
 10. A review of all the organizational forms available to interest groups is beyond the scope of this review. 
Super PACs can raise unlimited contributions for candidate advocacy, but they report their contributions in full 
to the Federal Election Commission. 501c) (4) groups are non-profit social welfare organizations, and they do 
not publicly report their donors. They can sponsor candidate advocacy messages so long as it is not their prima-
ry purpose. See Holly Schadler, The Connection: Strategies for Creating and Operating 501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s 
and Political Organizations, BOLDER ADVOC. (3d ed. 2012), http://bolderadvocacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/The_Connection_Ch1_paywall.pdf. 
 11. MARTY COHEN ET AL., THE PARTY DECIDES: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER 
REFORM 350 (2008). 
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about in the middle of last century.12 It is fair to say that the old dichotomy pictured 
groups and parties as positioned on either end of a seesaw, each teetering up or down in 
power or influence. Today, scholars see them all as one piece. 
There is a deep concern felt by many about this state of affairs. It was the trend to-
wards greater influence of donors (already underway by the mid-1990s, though on a 
lesser scale) that compelled Congress in 2002 to reform campaign finance, the first major 
reform in a generation. Gallons of ink have been spilled in various outlets to decry the 
role of money in elections, especially in the wake of the Roberts Court’s dismantling of 
many aspects of the 2002 reform (begun in Wisconsin Right to Life13 and Davis14 and ad-
vanced aggressively in Citizens United). 
In the run-up to the 2014 midterm elections, majorities of voting Democrats, Inde-
pendents, and Republicans in competitive Senate races agreed that super PAC spending 
was “wrong and leads to our elected officials representing the views of wealthy do-
nors.”15 Scholar Thomas Edsall asserts that the current campaign finance regime primari-
ly benefits “billionaires like the Koch brothers on the right and Tom Steyer on the left, 
[but] there is [also] a constituency within the superrich—those who would prefer to keep 
their political activities concealed from public view—that has also gained special protec-
tion” with the use of 501(c)(4)s.16 
It is this perspective that invites the commentary and analysis in the three recent 
books by Robert Post, Timothy Kuhner, and Zephyr Teachout discussed in this essay. 
Indeed, these are all brilliant books that situate the developments as outlined above in the 
scholarship, history, and jurisprudence on campaign finance and offer the reader a per-
spective from which to advocate for reform. In that sense, they all seek and achieve a 
rightful place in the canon on campaign finance and democratic theory. They were also a 
joy to read, all written in beautiful prose and by masters of the questions at hand. 
This review will follow two tracks. First, as discussed in Part I, all three books 
seek to address—to attack head on, in fact—conservative critiques of the regulation of 
campaign finance. It is important to consider first how these books seek to recast the de-
bate over regulatory politics in campaign finance as “in response to” as opposed to “in 
spite of” conservative pressure. Second, as Parts II and III explain, all three books ad-
dress—directly or indirectly; consciously or unconsciously—the role of evidence in the 
debate over money in politics and elections. They each do so with skill, but not without 
challenges. All three use evidence to bolster their argument when relevant; disregard 
counter-evidence selectively; and ignore entirely the complexity of empiricism as a 
weapon in the question of campaign finance. 
                                                
 12. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT (1942); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, SEMI-SOVEREIGN 
PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960). 
 13. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 14. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 15. Denver Nicks, Poll: Support for Campaign Finance Reform Strong in Key Senate Races, TIME, July 31, 
2015, http://time.com/3063942/poll-support-for-campaign-finance-reform-strong-in-key-senate-races. 
 16. Thomas B. Edsall, Can Anything Be Done About All the Money in Politics? N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/opinion/can-anything-be-done-about-all-the-money-in-politics.html?_r=0. 
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I. RESPONDING TO THE DEREGULATORS 
First, with respect to the issue of audience, Robert Post seeks to embrace the First 
Amendment and situate his rationale for campaign finance reform firmly within it. His 
book, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution, reflects his two 
Tanner Lectures at Harvard University in May 2013.17 In those lectures, Post translates 
the negative liberty of “Congress shall make no law” to the positive requirement that 
Congress must consider the legitimacy and integrity of the electoral process. Congress 
must do so to enhance citizens’ sense that speech in elections can send meaningful sig-
nals to elected officials—he terms this “representative integrity.” 
Post writes: “To understand First Amendment doctrine . . . and especially the kind 
of doctrine that is relevant to a decision like Citizens United, we must conceive First 
Amendment rights as designed to protect the processes of democratic legitimation.”18 
These are meant to include a free exchange of ideas and open debate about the strengths 
of weaknesses of candidates. But he does not want such rights to be abstracted. Processes 
of democratic legitimation have real meaning only when the act of speaking can be 
thought to have a measurable or perceived impact on the behavior and actions of elected 
officials. Post believes that the distribution of money in elections has undermined citi-
zens’ confidence that their speech is heard. He argues that such a weakened link between 
citizen and leader grants Congress the authority to act in the realm of campaign finance. 
For Post, the First Amendment only matters if Congress can act to restore citizen confi-
dence. 
One of Post’s key contributions is reviewing the primary rationales for regulating 
campaign finance.19 The most common rationales—and there is slippage around the 
boundaries of each—are equality, anti-distortion, and anti-corruption. In his second lec-
ture, Post addresses each in turn. 
He is not persuaded that concerns about equality—meant here as equally effective 
voices in the exchange of ideas20—can inform policy-making and also respect the pa-
rameters of the First Amendment. Put simply, there is no requirement in the First 
Amendment that everyone have an equal influence on policy-makers, only that people 
have an equal chance to make their case. 
Similarly, concerns about anti-distortion, where issue advocates have influence 
that outstrips the issue’s support among the general public,21 fall short, in part because of 
the fluidity of public opinion.22 Opinion formation is a process that involves a constant 
flow of information and vigorous give-and-take on political issues. Knowing how to 
measure distortion in such a context of fluidity is also not a rationale for reform that can 
                                                
 17. ROBERT POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014). 
 18. Id. at 41. 
 19. Id. at 44. Indeed, his broad review of American political development (from the strong party organiza-
tional era in the nineteenth Century to the Progressive Era and candidate-centered campaigns in the twentieth 
century) is worth the read regardless of its application to debates over campaign finance. 
 20. Id. at 47. 
 21. Id. at 51. Such a commensurate link between public opinion and its influence on policy can be mistaken 
for an equality rationale, and therein lays the slippage between them. 
 22. POST, supra note 17, at 53. 
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easily co-exist with the First Amendment. One can never be sure if a set of speakers is 
out of sync with a broader and ever changing public opinion. 
Anti-corruption is more widely understood to be a sound basis on which to regu-
late election financing, but the existence of a compelling state interest does not solve the 
challenge of operationalizing it through sound public policy. Corruption can mean many 
things to different people, Post asserts,23 and this argument leads us down a rabbit hole. 
To these three, Post adds system legitimacy as a separate rationale, a compelling 
state interest meant to enhance the speech rights enshrined by the First Amendment. In 
Post’s telling, electoral integrity is a requirement for free speech, lest citizens lose confi-
dence that established rights have real meaning. To be sure, he takes many positions em-
braced by liberals—for example, that corporations are not people protected under the 
First Amendment, but his primary goal is to use Free Speech as the cloak for government 
regulatory policy. 
Such an approach is compelling, and it is persuasive. Kuhner and Teachout also 
seek to engage free speech advocates, but they both do so on different tracks.24 In Capi-
talism v. Democracy: Money in Politics and the Free Market Constitution, Kuhner rec-
ognizes that a free market is critical to American life and culture, but his primary argu-
ment is that the market suffers under the weight of crony capitalists (he uses the term 
nineteen times within forty pages25) empowered by Citizens United. The market can only 
perform as we hope it to perform (letting producers of popular and/or important products 
enter the market and earn a commensurate return) if Congress can treat campaign fi-
nance, and the distribution of campaign cash, as a trust it can bust. Market winners 
should not win because of political connections (leveraged by funding super PACs or 
non-profit groups, or by acting as “bundlers” of campaign donations) over expertise or 
ingenuity. 
Indeed, it is well understood that not all market behavior is good capitalism—a 
point made clear by the economic recession of 2008. Kuhner says to that effect: “No de-
fender of capitalism would endorse the behavior of those particular capitalists, who will 
be remembered, one hopes, as traitors, not traders.”26 He adds: “If the incentives within 
political markets go against the integrity of capitalism itself, then capitalism and democ-
racy would be allies in the struggle for political finance reform.”27 
Indeed, good capitalists should strive for a separation of capitalism and democracy. 
(By this he means that wealth should not infect or direct democratic policy-making.) It 
should be a cultural force akin to the constitutional (if still contested) separation of 
                                                
 23. Id. at 57. Indeed, it is often defined as inequality in influence or the distortive effects in discourse from 
disproportionately wealthy speakers. 
 24. TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY: MONEY IN POLITICS AND THE FREE MARKET 
CONSTITUTION 242 (2014); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S 
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 9 (2014). The arguments of Kuhner and Teachout could be characterized as 
“gotchas” in the sense that both seem to engage conservatives on their own turf, turning devotion to the free 
market and originalism into advantages for the liberal position. Another way to say this that Kuhner and 
Teachout seem to play offense in making their case, while Post’s style of argumentation is more defensive. 
 25. See KUHNER, supra note 24, at 242-81. 
 26. Id. at 239. 
 27. Id. 
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church and state, and also to the institutionalized separation of powers: “Consumers and 
citizens, and capitalism and democracy are interdependent pairings that depend, curious-
ly enough, on separation.”28 He advances his argument as a “third separation,” one also 
that needs a constitutional signature.29 Here, again, we see engagement with traditional 
opponents to regulation. For Post, free speech is an empty gesture absent citizen efficacy; 
for Kuhner, the free market is an illusion absent oversight and mechanisms to enforce 
fair play. 
In Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens Unit-
ed, Teachout too seeks to address the critics. She positions her argument in relation to 
advocates of constitutional original meaning. She sets up a challenge: to enshrine the 
views of the Founders as sacrosanct means also to accept or consider their conception of 
corruption. To wit, historically, corruption—at the Founding, in the early Republic, in 
the Gilded Age—has been consistently understood as involving more than quid pro quo 
relationships between donors and election officials. Teachout is apoplectic at the thought 
that the Supreme Court could be so ahistorical in its consideration of corruption. 
Teachout tells compelling stories about various moments in American political de-
velopment—and she tells them wonderfully—where politicians, citizens, and state and 
federal courts struggled with conceptions of corruption but more often than not viewed it 
broadly. Can a law passed by a corrupt legislature (where votes were bought and sold) be 
invalid on its face? Can the federal government use laws against mail fraud and racket-
eering to prosecute elected legislators for potentially corrupt behavior? Is it corrupt to 
accept modest gifts from foreign officials in the course of representing American diplo-
matic interests? Teachout tells us that many have answered in the affirmative to all three 
questions—and others—asked in actual controversies. Indeed, she tracks the numerous 
instances where corruption was viewed as “excessive private interests in the public 
sphere; [and where an] act is [considered] corrupt when private interests trump public 
ones in the exercise of public power; [and where] a person is corrupt when they use pub-
lic power for their own ends, disregarding others.”30 
As such, Teachout offers the reader some “liberal originalism.”31 If one considers 
what the Framers understood corruption to mean, Teachout hopes, it can empower con-
temporary policy-makers by underlining the constitutional legitimacy of aggressive 
lawmaking. She wonders: “What if we could add ‘anticorruption’ to citizens’ sense of 
national identity?”32 Indeed, given the structural designs of American government—with 
separate institutions across federal layers—should it not be obvious that the Framers 
considered seriously and were concerned about the public sphere’s infection by private 
                                                
 28. Id. at 274. 
 29. Id. at 283. 
 30. TEACHOUT, supra note 24, at 9. 
 31. It seems from the perspective of this writer—a political scientist and not a constitutional law scholar—
that originalism as adopted by contemporary conservatives is a convenient trope in either the absence of con-
vincing facts or in the presence of damning facts. See Robert Post, Liberal Originalism, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
Sept. 17, 2007, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/liberal-originalism (9/19/15) (discussing something to this 
effect in the cited article: “[it creates a] capacity to reshape Supreme Court precedents into a ‘living constitu-
tion’ for right-wing convictions”). 
 32. TEACHOUT, supra note 24, at 12. 
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interests? 
All three authors want their arguments to make sense to conservatives, perhaps 
even to shift the debate among conservatives. They offer some intellectual heft to the 
now-stale advocacy in this sphere for equality or anti-distortion. Those latter arguments 
are still embraced by liberals, and they are popular with the public. But the Court as cur-
rently constituted is uninterested in them, and they are dead on arrival in a congressional 
environment where House Republicans look entrenched. The arguments as presented by 
Post, Kuhner, and Teachout are new in the sense that they represent repurposed arma-
ment for the policy-making left. 
There are challenges in these arguments, however. These challenges do not un-
dermine their larger projects, but they represent formidable bumps in the road. It is here 
that the question of data and empirics is foregrounded. 
II. DATA-DRIVEN SOLUTIONS 
These three books cry out for the political scientist; in fact they nearly taunt politi-
cal science to comment. And it is clear that the discipline is “hot” at the moment. In a 
variety of forms—on blogs and in dialogue with the press33—political scientists are bent 
on ramming their way into relevance, both in policy-making and with the Court. This is 
no truer than in the realm of campaign finance.34 
What might a political scientist have to say about such questions more generally 
and these books specifically? Answering Post is probably the most straightforward. He 
recognizes the empirical claims inherent in his thesis, but he is entirely uninterested in 
exploring them. Indeed, he adopts the explicit approach of claiming them as beyond his 
purview and mandate. He says: “I shall not explore whether electoral integrity is in fact 
at risk, or whether campaign finance reform will in fact ameliorate that risk. I argue only 
that the protection of electoral integrity constitutes a compelling state interest.”35 Later, 
he adds, “[i]f it is indeed true that uncontrolled expenditures threaten to undermine the 
electoral integrity of our representative system, we also face a potential loss of democrat-
ic legitimation if we choose to do nothing.”36 
His reaction is frustrating. In the first passage Post sidesteps the empirical ques-
tion, but in the second he asks the reader to stipulate to its veracity (while also hedging—
“a potential loss”). He need not collect and analyze data on the questions at hand, but 
                                                
 33. See, e.g., The Monkey Cage, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2016); see also Mischiefs of Factions, VOX, http://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction (last visit-
ed Jan. 1, 2016). 
 34. Not forgotten are controversies in social science concerning the use of suspect data. In the summer of 
2015, a political scientist was discovered to have falsified data surrounding a landmark publication in Science. 
See Benedict Carey, Study on Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage Is Retracted by a Scientific Journal, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/29/science/journal-science-retracts-study-on-gay-
canvassers-and-same-sex-marriage.html. Unrelated to that, but relevant to the point, the American Journal of 
Political Science recently mandated that all accepted papers undergo independent replications, with full data 
sets and code supplied to the journal and to readers. See The AJPS Replication Policy: Innovations and Revi-
sions, AM. J. POL. SCI., Mar. 26, 2015, http://ajps.org/2015/03/26/the-ajps-replication-policy-innovations-and-
revisions. 
 35. POST, supra note 17, at 65. 
 36. Id. at 91. 
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sidestepping the key question involves an unjustifiable dodge. For if the distribution of 
money in elections is not causally related to citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity, 
then what is the point of the exercise? 
It is curious that he also relies on the absence of empirical data to refute the 
Court’s current stance on campaign finance law. He says:  
 
[I]t is an empirical question whether [limits on electioneering by 
groups] actually diminishes the flow of useful information to the pub-
lic. Citizens United presumes that the public will be better informed af-
ter it strikes down [those limits] than in the decades before the Citizens 
United decision. But this is far from obvious.37  
 
He does this also at the end of the book in regards to the Court’s current stance on voter 
ID laws:  
 
The problem with Crawford38 [in upholding Indiana’s voter identification law] 
is not the validity of the government interest in confidence, but rather the ab-
sence of any factual demonstration that confidence was actually at risk despite 
severe and demonstrable curtailments of the right to vote. . . . The lesson to be 
learned . . . is that facile invocations of public confidence, unsupported by any 
record, and unqualified by any consideration of competing constitutional val-
ues, can be very dangerous indeed.39 
 
Indeed. Where is the factual record that links perceptions of democratic legitimacy 
to variations in campaign finance policy? How do we balance policies as designed 
and implemented against a clear competing constitutional value of free speech? 
Post’s book is enriched by the commentaries following his essays. Their authors 
address Post from a variety of angles, making each well worth the read. Pamela Karlan’s 
response, for example, is steeped in concerns over data and empirical relationships. 
Moreover, Karlan worries that appeals to electoral integrity might also inspire a range of 
exclusionary public policies.40 That is, voter ID laws might gain greater constitutional 
justification if Post is successful at advancing perceptions of integrity as a compelling 
state interest.41 It seems possible, at least, that stated or assumed causal relationships can 
become powerful political ammunition. 
To be fair, Post is not unaware of the empirical questions at hand, and neither is 
Kuhner. But Kuhner too moves in and out of the question of empirics. He takes the 
Court’s conservatives to task for rejecting evidence in the debate over political rights. In 
an enlightening discussion of broader theoretical approaches to campaign finance, Kuh-
                                                
 37. Id. at 87. 
 38. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 39. POST, supra note 17, at 164. 
 40. Id. at 148. 
 41. Id. at 149. 
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ner reviews the perspectives of public choice scholars, advocates of republicanism, and 
the views of “deontological” liberals.42 The “deontological” view is one where “funda-
mental rights can trump social goals.”43 That is, where evidence can be considered irrel-
evant in evaluating policies and the scope of their impingement on rights (more specifi-
cally, where restrictions on campaign spending can be seen as too onerous an 
infringement on free speech). Kuhner argues that the Court seems to take this position as 
its lodestar on the broader issue,44 all the while relying on assumed empirical relation-
ships to refute many critics:  
 
The Court has told us that the marketplace of ideas produces a great 
deal of information from diverse sources, informs the electorate, and 
brings about the changes desired by people. By stipulating to such 
goals, the Court abandons deontology for consequentialism. Once de-
sirable consequences have been specified, it follows that types of 
speech that go against those objectives must be regulated.45 
 
This frustrates Kuhner, where the Roberts Court sometimes embraces and sometimes 
dismisses a need for evidence.  
  But Kuhner’s dismay at a “deontological” perspective seems to push the point 
too far. It is hard to know how devotion to principle can ever avoid some empirical prop-
ositions. If one believes in free speech, for example, is it unreasonable to argue for its 
advantages, an argument that inherently relies on an empirical foundation? Those advo-
cating gun rights because of the Second Amendment clearly argue against gun control 
policies from a rights-based position, but these advocates assert (with an implication to 
empirical evidence) that guns help citizens protect both themselves and the community. 
In other words, it seems likely that a deontological liberal will often make empirical 
claims in spite of him or herself. A fairer read on the deontological position is this: one 
can and should defend political rights, and defend them vigorously, against claims that 
are not fully fleshed out or supported with data. 
To that point, Kuhner himself makes strong empirical claims. He reminds the read-
er of a range of studies documenting the wealth disparities between political donors and 
the general public.46 This is refreshing. But at other times he makes claims about “the 
market of misleading ads . . . [and a] privatized multimedia market . . . saturated by su-
perficial and misleading ads.”47 But what exactly is misleading, and what studies have 
counted or documented the quantity of misleading versus informative campaign messag-
es? He acknowledges that “[l]obbying does not cause policy outcomes that can be pin-
                                                
    42. KUHNER, supra note 24, at 180. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 187. Ultimately, he dismisses this as the underlying theory of the Roberts Court on campaign fi-
nance. It is, he says, something far simpler and more troubling. It is the “right of capital to enjoy political pow-
er commensurate to its economic power . . . a purpose too unpopular to be professed.” 
 45. Id. at 181-82. 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 60. 
 47. KUHNER, supra note 24, at 142-43. 
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pointed in every case,” but adds, “[lobbying] is effective enough to be demanded by 
those who have much to gain or lose from political outcomes.”48 There is a big differ-
ence, though, between lobbying as a surefire way to leverage political outcomes and lob-
bying as a hedge in the process of policy-making. More assertively, he subheads one sec-
tion “The Effects of Political Markets that Everybody Must Concede”49—but that seems 
more like wishful thinking. 
A different way to make this critique about the role of data is to say that policy so-
lutions are largely absent from these books. To make a case for reform and to establish 
the policy-making authority and space for it are only the beginning. Questions of policy 
content and reach and the empirical implications of policies on voters or elites are too 
critical to leave undeveloped. 
Teachout never quite gives us a vision of how anti-corruption works in policy-
making practice. Should we limit corporate involvement in the electoral realm? How? 
Advocating as such only raises concerns about loopholes and the sticky challenge of al-
lowing “genuine” issue advocacy. Do we not already know that limitations in one realm 
seem likely to move money to another? Should wealthy individuals be allowed to spend 
their own money on independent expenditures or in running for office? That is, can 
someone use his or her sizeable private fortune to move the public debate? Or is private 
interest in a public sphere trending too close to what Teachout considers corruption? 
Teachout knows these are challenges, but she is unconcerned: “you might conclude that 
corruption cannot be used in law because its essential imprecision leads to lawless-
ness, . . . [but] the rule of law cannot survive without anticorruption measures. . . . We 
should embrace the anticorruption principle’s uneasy role.”50 
How do we design real solutions to the concerns expressed in these books, howev-
er—ones commensurate to the problem as outlined? Post says, for example, that we need 
“wholesome legislation that nourishes democratic legitimacy.”51 Teachout flips the un-
certain boundaries of the concept of corruption into a positive grant: “[W]hy . . . not take 
the natural next step and directly engage the foundational questions of the values that an-
ticorruption laws serve and their role in a democracy?”52 It is not hard to agree in princi-
ple to these views. It is another thing to envision how they work in practice. How do we 
operationalize “wholesome,” and what policy will in fact nourish? These are hard ques-
tions, and they demand a data-driven exposition. 
III. DATA-DRIVEN LIMITS 
Prioritizing data and empirics makes perfect sense for the social scientist. It is like-
ly frustrating to the jurist and the policy-maker, however. There is a bit of danger, in-
deed, in placing so much emphasis on empirical relationships. In point of fact, and to the 
question of campaign finance, there is firepower on both sides. The causal relationship 
                                                
 48. Id. at 206. 
 49. Id. at 219. 
 50. TEACHOUT, supra note 24, at 279-89. 
 51. POST, supra note 17, at 89. 
 52. TEACHOUT, supra note 24, at 304. 
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between the distribution of money and electoral and policy-making outcomes is very 
hard to discern. Consider the current body of evidence: 
 
• PAC contributions appear not to influence congressional roll call votes.53 
• But donors appear to get more access to policymakers.54 
• Lobbying cash is not a strong predictor of policy success.55 
• Yet the preferences of the affluent seem more strongly related to policy outcomes 
than the median voter.56 
 
And this is only a smattering of the scholarship. 
There is more here, though, than scholarly disagreements. Even evidence itself has 
fallen victim to politics. The Economist noted in 2014: 
 
Perhaps politics is flooded with more data than voters want or can use-
fully process? Some of those vowing to ‘explain’ the world empirically 
are sincere: their reverence for data betrays a certain despair among 
moderates, as they try to construct a canon of basic facts whose mean-
ing right and left may constructively debate. Other data-lovers are par-
tisans in disguise, engaging in an arms race with foes: you sow doubt 
about global warming with glacier measurements, here are 100 years 
of sea temperatures to end debate. You say welfare is out of control, 
my numbers show the worst inequality since the Robber Barons. Each 
slab of fresh research is a new way of waging old cultural wars. . . . If I 
hate you, your facts are wrong. . . . In today’s politics everything is a 
weapon with which to club the opposition. Why should facts be differ-
ent?57 
 
The social scientist should stipulate, then, to these challenges. Facts-as-weapons is 
part and parcel of contemporary politics, but it should not doom the effort to apply rigor 
to the issues at hand. Indeed, political science is particularly adept at designing compel-
ling research designs about the role of money and its effect on campaigns. Such ap-
proaches, among others, (1) leverage varied state campaign finance laws against voter 
perceptions,58 (2) deploy field experiments of ad effects,59 or (3) design laboratory exper-
                                                
 53. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 114 
(2003). 
 54. Richard Hall & Frank Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Con-
gressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 814 (1990); David Broockman & Joshua Kalla, Campaign 
Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment, AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. (forthcoming). 
 55. FRANK BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND 
WHY 221 (2009). 
 56. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. POL. 564 (2014). 
 57. When Facts Are Weapons, THE ECONOMIST, May 3, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21601516-politicians-have-never-had-access-so-much-data-how-come-their-debates-are-so. 
 58. David Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the 
 
11
Franz: Addressing Conservatives and (Mis)Using Social Sciences in the De
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
FRANZ_3.2.16.DOCX	(DO	NOT	DELETE)	 3/4/16		1:12	AM	
370 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:359 
iments that test implications of formal models on the effects of campaign negativity.60 
We are now beyond dismissing such research as endogenous or hampered by lack of 
good data. 
The problem of varied and contradictory evidence, however, is no small matter. To 
be sure, all three authors want something quite modest, perhaps—a consideration of jus-
tifications beyond quid pro quo corruption. But we are not out of the woods with modes-
ty. As Chief Justice Roberts has said: “Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie 
goes to the speaker, not the censor.”61 That is, the evidence must be deep and the causal 
pathways clear. 
Moreover, we can use data to justify new law or new regulations, but we still have 
a First Amendment that in its simplicity would seem to advantage the conservative side. 
This is what Roberts is contending with his baseball metaphor. Is it enough to say that 
free speech was not always so strong a force in the jurisprudence, as all three authors do? 
Post writes: “[W]e . . . never pause to ask why First Amendment doctrine did not emerge 
until the aftermath of World War I.”62 Does pausing justify anything about the here and 
now in which the balance of the Court cares deeply about the First Amendment? Is free 
speech’s relevance all the more powerful today when the causal effects of campaign fi-
nance policy on voters or elites is hard to know? 
In a sense, all three books perform the sort of “constitutional culture work”63 that is 
likely necessary to shift the debate. They tell the sort of stories meant to recast campaign 
finance as constitutionally-based projects. But the role of hard evidence still lurks. The 
debate over campaign finance needs the social scientist. Because something is difficult—
and perhaps unlikely to resolve titanic constitutional challenges—does not diminish its 
potential value. The judiciary should demand more than anecdotes, and they should lis-
ten deeply to what the evidence establishes.  
The role of evidence is clear in many other domains. In the debate over the “one 
person, one vote” standard, the Court was moved deeply by the evidence of malappor-
tionment and the seemingly nonsensical reasons by which states in the first half the 
twentieth century avoided redrawing district lines.64 Social science has devoted consider-
able effort to conceptualizing, measuring, and testing the role of race in the design and 
implementation of electoral rules, and more broadly, to documenting the level of racial 
sentiment still present in society. Social scientists have contributed much of this research 
to policy-makers considering changes to or reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act.65 
                                                
States, 5 ELECTION L. J. 23 (2006). 
 59. Alan S. Gerber et al., How Large and Long-lasting are the Persuasive Effects of Televised Campaign 
Ads? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 135 (2011). 
   60. KYLE MATTES & DAVID REDLAWSK, THE POSITIVE CASE FOR NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING (2014). 	 61.	 FEC	v.	Wisconsin	Right	to	Life,	Inc.,	551	U.S.	449,	474	(2007).	
 62. POST, supra note 17, at 41. See generally id. at 8-40 (historically documenting why speech and public 
opinion become so critical to American elections in the aftermath of the Progressive Era). 
 63. Ken I. Kersch, The Talking Cure: How Constitutional Argument Drives Constitutional Development, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 1083, 1099 (2014). 
 64. STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES SNYDER, THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008). 
 65. David C. Kimball, Judges Are Not Social Scientists (Yet), 12 ELECTION L.J. 324 (2013). 
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President Obama has embedded in his regulatory approach a wider consideration of evi-
dence from behavioral science, most recently with an Executive Order.66 The Order as-
serts: “Where Federal policies have been designed to reflect behavioral science insights, 
they have substantially improved outcomes for the individuals, families, communities, 
and businesses those policies serve.”67 
Using evidence may leave some questions unanswered, especially in the realm of 
money and elections, but evidence can and should inform the way the courts evaluate 
whether a policy meets the standard of a compelling state interest. Indeed, liberals may 
often lose a debate in which evidence plays a primary role. All three authors likely know 
this. The evidence as we have it now is just too varied to point to a clear way forward. 
Which is to say, liberals may suffer policy-making defeats even in the context of persua-
sive “constitutional culture work.”68 And so it may be, and perhaps must be, in a political 
system that puts the First Amendment first. 
 
 
                                                
 66. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, EXECUTIVE ORDER: USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 
INSIGHTS TO BETTER SERVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, Sept. 15, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/09/15/executive-order-using-behavioral-science-insights-better-serve-american. 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   Kersch, supra note 63. 
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